

# WSEG studies 1964

11 Aug 64

Weapons Systems Evaluation Group

Interim Report 15 July 64

Critical Incident Studies  
for J-3

[1] studies: differences between war games and reality.

Big stake poker vs. matchsticks.

In real crises:

- 1) Command breaks out of normal channels.  
<sup>process</sup>
- 2) Effects of <sup>on decisions</sup> power, interest, (responsibility; publicity)  
real nuclear threat.

[3. Surprise

<sup>prior</sup> 4. Commitment, predictions, warnings.

5. Political opposition, critics

6. Internal resistance: { <sup>secrecy</sup>  
compartmentation  
high-level rigidity

## Less II

2. "History that is pertinent to the problems of the operator."

Focus on mechanism and process rather than outcome  
alone; on the form in which events presented themselves  
to those in <sup>line of</sup> command responsibility; with all the

confusions, behind alleges, unknowns, ambiguities presented.  
Usual history is not only not helpful, but is deceptively misleading. Doesn't



## [Commanders' secrets:]

1. Whose advice, opinion they really trust and desire.
- 2) Shows up when they have to allocate listening time closely. Ex Communication.
- 3) Desire to work in privacy, by phone or face-to-face.

[How/why was it important to see K-K letters?]

[Was "communication" a real problem in Cuban crisis;  
was problem one of explaining or convincing: of  
K's understanding or his belief?]

[Was it useful to convey caution to K, as distinct  
from being cautious?] (always useful to rationalize caution this way).



How would Johnston know of Pers participation?

SG?

Role of SI?

Diplomatic: with USSR, ...

"no record of the issue rising above the level of Sec Def and Under Sec State. CC

Why did Brown back Sauvanna, instead of Phonni?

Where were French?

Why State emphasis on negotiated settlement?

Forces needed; so many in charge of forces  
hard to be supported; but he is confident  
+ UK + French  
with non State wanted to support ... military and hidden  
(Two sets of "good guys")





DAVE Borchinal, Director, Joint Staff  
Burchinal

1809Z, 22 Oct

1. Cuba: DEFCON 3 message sent out in clear, 5

hours ahead of speech — to go to 3 at time

of speech. Are EAP geared to US responses,  
rather than to US-initiated actions?

[Riding's message, TSX to C/NCS, criticized  
as departure from procedures, too limited in dist.

But...']

(Johnston also criticizes!)

2. Cuban Planning Group role (2 Oct?)

Johnson Task Force

3. Why did JCS meet in Gold Room instead of NMCC?

4. Real possibility of operating from alternate site? Problems?

5. Possibility of a) SOPs for crisis ops

b) "Panels" of cleared people.

6. Are there really, crisis EAPs? Plans for messages,  
warning?



20 Oct Fighting began between Choson + Indian troops

22-23 Oct Yemeni aircraft attacked Aden territory  
and Oct 1 presence of Egyptian troops on Yemen admitted.  
3 Nov first shipment of US arms to India arrived.

7. Effect of using SSO channels for communication!



Studies had: message traffic, J-3. some files  
+ interviews

Back of covers of WSEG Studies:

- |                             |               |                    |                        |
|-----------------------------|---------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| 1. White House              | }             | meetings           | telecons               |
| 2. JCS                      |               | memos              | informal meetings      |
| 3. NSC                      |               | agenda             | EO cables              |
| 4. SG                       |               | letters            | Pres - foreign letters |
| 5. USIB                     |               | drafts             | Dip. contacts; memos   |
| 6. COMOR, etc.              |               | working papers     | Dip.                   |
| 7. OSD                      |               | NSAMS              |                        |
| 8. <sup>Sec</sup> State     |               | SNIEs?             |                        |
| 9. <sup>DDI</sup> C/A ODP   |               | INR<br>C/A memos   |                        |
| 10. Diplomatic; Conferences |               | Conference minutes |                        |
| 11. Int. Commun.            | ONE, DIA, INR |                    |                        |
12. SI ; ad traffic over SSO channels.
13. T, K ; COMOR, SG etc.
14. All-source intell. bulletins



WSEG : Staff's-eye view

This, imperfect awareness of :

1. Press role
2. Invisible Gov ; org SG, etc.
3. Info available to top: Estimates, SI, T, K, CIB, CL  
Dipl., letters, telecons
4. Political motives, considerations (e.g. election campaign)
5. Alliances aims, pressures
6. Personal stakes.
7. View of problem by key decision-makers; Pres, etc.
8. Control, influence of intelligence / recon process.
9. " " " " " covert ops process.

(SIOB, EAP "operations" are more visible.)



In Laos:

In ~~Nov~~ <sup>at Lawrence's request</sup> Dec 1960, the Laos were supporting the  
"legal" <sup>which we recognized</sup> gov of Laos, and we were covertly supporting  
a rebel movement. When ours took over, we couldn't get  
allies (except Thai, Phil, SVN and China) to recognize it!

Why wasn't France more active? When were her forces?

Dec. 13 - Laos accused US - accurately - of violating Geneva Accords.

List reasons for covertress.

<sup>CAS</sup>  
Role of CAT, Air America, Thais; B-26s, T-6s,

Actions of Kong Le - a CAS favorite - similar to

actions of SVN special troops vs. Buddhists, under Nguyen?

How did election campaign influence?

Description of allies? (their knowledge of coup?)

Any surprises?



altitude of Mansfield

What do French & British see as future of coalition  
with pro-Communists in it?

Phoumi suspicious of wanting to run a separate Southern Laos!

Had been attacking the Geneva Accords

Suspended Constitution, etc.

Backers might prefer 3-way split of country.

"Attack" by "VM - Chions" according to RLG, and  
accepted by world press, had to be countered  
by US (Lansdale) — (even if phony?) just as  
Tonkin Gulf "incidents" had to be countered, to save  
US prestige.

Parallel: RLG claims of VM, VC  
Turk claim of flights to Syria  
Cuban claim of low missiles





Why didn't we more openly <sup>SO</sup> support of Laos?

Fear of DRV - PRC intervention?

[Technique? Find out what our estimate would say;  
then get one, or not.]

Was <sup>in Jan '61</sup> then a decision to give DDP major responsibility  
for quasi-military ops in Cuba & Laos?  
(Nitze, Brinkley, McElwain?)

State - purely diplomatic/political moves

DOO - purely military

CIA - purely covert

} ?